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Introduction 
  The availability of immigrant farmworkers from Mexico may be the single most 
important factor shaping the future of fruit, vegetable, and horticultural (FVH) production 
in the United States (U.S.), affecting cropping patterns, choice of production 
technologies, and the ability of U.S. producers to compete with low-cost producers 
abroad. According to the National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS), Mexico-born 
persons represented an estimated 77 percent of the U.S. farm workforce in 1997-98 (up 
from 57 percent in 1990; U.S. Department of Labor, 2000 and 1991).  Most of these 
workers (52 percent) were unauthorized. An overwhelming majority originate from 
households in rural Mexico (U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997).  
Two major policy changes, The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), together with 
intensified enforcement along the southern U.S. border, were aimed wholly or partially at 
curtailing the flow of unauthorized Mexico-to-U.S. migration, potentially reducing the 
supply of labor to U.S. farms. The goal of this research is to econometrically test the 
effect of these policy changes on the flow of migrant labor from rural Mexico to U.S. 
farms.  We do this by estimating a model for migration using retrospective data from the 
2003 National Mexico Rural Household Survey.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
Given individual, household and community characteristics, policy changes may 
alter the larger milieu within which migration decisions take place.  IRCA represented an 
exogenous policy effort to control migration.  In light of U.S. farmers￿ reliance on 
unauthorized immigrant labor, IRCA had the potential for disproportionately large  
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impacts on agricultural labor markets.  NAFTA was only partially motivated by 
migration concerns but was expected to have far-reaching impacts on migration flows.
1 
Sharp increases in U.S. border enforcement were intended to curtail unauthorized 
immigration.   
All three policies￿ possible impacts on migration are complex and theoretically 
ambiguous.  For example, although IRCA imposed fines on U.S. employers for 
knowingly hiring unauthorized immigrants, it also legalized large numbers of 
unauthorized immigrants already in the United States.  NAFTA requires a phase-out of 
price supports for Mexico￿s maize farmers, but it also opened up U.S. markets to 
Mexican agricultural exports and rural Mexico to U.S. agricultural investments.  
Increased U.S. border enforcement, while increasing the cost and risks of border 
crossings, also discouraged return migration by those who succeed in crossing the border. 
Thus, the net effects of these policy shocks on the migration of labor from rural Mexico 
to U.S. farms are ambiguous and can only be determined empirically.   
Isolating effects of policy changes on migration is complicated not only by the 
plethora of individual, household and community variables influencing migration 
decisions over time but macroeconomic shocks that may have affected migration.  These 
include major devaluations of the Mexican peso and shifts in per-capita GDP in both 
countries.  Our econometric analysis controls explicitly for these variables.  It also 
                                                 
1 Presidents Salinas and Bush argued that opening up markets would help Mexico export 
more goods and fewer people, thereby reducing migration pressures.  However, the 
Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic 
Development warned that freer trade could temporarily increase migration pressures as 
labor markets adjust to new market realities.     
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controls for migration networks or contacts in both farm and non farm labor markets in 
the United States, represented by lagged stocks of villagers in farm and non farm jobs. 
 
Theoretical Model   
At the micro level, international migration is only observed for households and 
family members that choose to participate in migration, which is a discrete decision.  
Migrants are individuals for which the expected benefits of migration, R, exceed the 
(unobserved) migration ￿reservation wage,￿ ω .  The migration reservation wage depends 
on local opportunities on and off the farm.  Following Mincer, the local wage is a 
function of human capital that affects the marginal productivity of labor.  Let XW denote 
a vector of human capital characteristics influencing wage income in the local labor 
market.  The productivity of family members￿ labor on the farm and in other local off-
farm activities is shaped both by these human capital variables and by family assets, K . 
Remittances are a function of migrants￿ human capital, which affects earnings, as well as 
their motivations to remit, which may be influenced by both human capital and family 
assets (Lucas and Stark, Taylor).  Contacts at migrant destinations are a form of 
migration capital,  K M , that can enhance the labor-market prospects of migrants 
(Munshi). 
Migrant remittances and reservation wages have both deterministic and stochastic 
components; thus,   u X R R R + = ) (  and  v X + = ) ( ϖ ϖ ϖ , where  ] , [ K X X W = ϖ , 
] , , [ K M K X X W R = , and u  and v are stochastic errors.  Letting  i δ = 1 if household 
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where  i i i u v − = η .  Total migration is simply the sum of individuals who migrate; that is, 
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i M δ .  Let  t θ  represent the joint distribution of variables  R X  and  ϖ X  in 
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where  jt Z  is a vector of community variables influencing the productivity of labor in 
local activities and remittances. In the econometric model, we control for the influences 





The econometric model we estimate is a fixed effects panel data model of the 
following form: 
(3) 
jt t t t t
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− −
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where  jt M  denotes total migration from community j to U.S. farm jobs at time t=2,...,23 
(1981-2002); MNFARMjt is migration to U.S. nonfarm jobs;  j α is the community effect; 
t IRCA  is a policy dummy variable equal to 1 for all time periods beginning in 1986, the 
year of IRCA￿s implementation, and zero otherwise;  t NAFTA  is a dummy variable equal  
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to 1 beginning in 1994 (the year NAFTA was implemented) and zero otherwise;  t BE  is 
expenditure on border enforcement at time t;  t ER ∆  denotes the percentage change in the 
peso-dollar exchange rate between times t and t-1; t USGDP  and  t MXGDP  are U.S. and 
Mexico per-capita GDP, respectively, at time t; 2 1,δ δ , 4 ,..., 1 , = k k β  and 2 1,ϕ ϕ are 
parameters to be estimated; and  jt u  are stochastic errors.  Under the null hypothesis of no 
policy impacts on migration,  0 = k β   k ∀ . 
 
Data 
The data to estimate the model are from a nationwide rural household survey 
carried out jointly by the University of California, Davis, and El Colegio de Mexico in 
Mexico City.  The Mexico National Rural Household Survey (Encuesta Nacional a 
Hogares Rurales de Mexico, or ENHRUM) provides retrospective data on migration by 
individuals from sample of rural households that is both nationally and regionally 
representative.  The survey was carried out in January and February 2003.  The sample 
for the present analysis includes 336 households from the West Central region, which 
traditionally has been the largest source region for Mexico-to-U.S. migration.  INEGI 
(Instituto Nacional de Estad￿stica, Geograf￿a e Informacion), Mexico￿s national census 
office, designed the sampling frame to provide a statistically reliable characterization of 
Mexico￿s population living in rural areas, defined by the Mexican government as 
communities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants.  For reasons of cost and tractability, 
individuals in hamlets or disperse populations with fewer than 500 inhabitants were not 
included in the survey.  The result is a sample that is representative of more than 80 
percent of the population that the Mexican census office considers to be rural.  
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The survey assembled complete migration histories from 1980 through 2002 for 
(a) the household head, (b) the spouse of the head, (c) all individuals who lived in the 
household 3 months or more in 2002, and (d) a random sample of all sons and daughters 
of either the head or his/her spouse who lived outside the household longer than 3 months 
in 2002. The survey provides far and away the most reliable longitudinal data on 
migration from rural Mexican communities to U.S. farm jobs. 
 
Estimation and Results 
  Survey data show an upward trend in migration from Mexican villages to both U.S. 
farm and nonfarm jobs throughout the period, with migration to nonfarm jobs accelerating 
during the second half of the decade (Figure 1).
2  In 2002, nearly 17 percent of villagers 
from this region were working in the United States.  Most migrants were employed in 
nonfarm rather than farm jobs.  Nevertheless, the data reveal an increasing trend in 
migration from Mexican villages to U.S. farms.   
  Figure 2 illustrates both the increasing shares of villagers migrating to the United 
States and the shifting composition of this region￿s rural Mexico-to-U.S. migration in favor 
of U.S. non farm jobs.  In most villages, the percentage of villagers in both U.S. farm and 
nonfarm jobs increased between 1980 and 2002, but the percentage in nonfarm jobs rose 
more rapidly, as shown by the rays in the figure.  In a few cases, the percentage in farm jobs 
decreased.  In only 2 of the 16 villages did the share of villagers in nonfarm jobs go down. 
                                                 
2 The surge in migration to the United States in the 1990s is mirrored in U.S. Census 2000 data.  The U.S. 
Census does not provide information on where migrants originate in Mexico (e.g., from rural or urban 
areas).  However, they show an unexpectedly large increase in Mexico-born persons living in the United 
States.  
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  We estimate the model using ordinary least squares.  The data set for this region 
provides information on migration from 16 villages over 23 years (from 1980 to 2002); 
however, one year (16 observations) is lost as a result of lagged right-hand-side variables.  
Thus, the total sample size is 352. 
  Table 1 presents variable definitions and means and Table 2 reports the 
econometric results.  The regression explains a significant share of the variation in 
migration to U.S. farm jobs over time (R
2 = 0.93).  The estimated coefficient on lagged 
farm migration is 0.90, indicating that there is a substantial amount of inertia in 
migration. This result is consistent with the theory that increases in migration build 
networks of contacts that lead to future increases in migration. These networks have a 
persistent but not permanent effect on future migration because the coefficient, although 
large, is significantly less than one. The coefficient on lagged number of villagers in U.S. 
non farm jobs is significant at the 10% level, but is much smaller (0.03), suggesting a 
small network effect that flows from non-farm to farm jobs. 
  Controlling for time trend and lagged migration, the policy variables are either 
insignificant or else positively associated with migration to farm jobs.  Results suggest 
that U.S. border enforcement has no effect on the supply of Mexican labor to U.S. farms 
(t=￿0.53).  Migration shifts upward following NAFTA, by approximately 0.5 migrants 
per village (21 households). The 1986 IRCA appears to shift the supply of U.S. farm 
labor upward, by a similar amount.  The small negative coefficient on the time trend 
suggests a decreasing trend in migration from rural areas in this region to U.S. farm jobs, 
all else equal. Thus, the increasing migration level that is evident in Figure 1 is 
attributable to NAFTA and IRCA.  
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  Once we control for the dynamics of the migration process and policy effects, 
macroeconomic variables do not significantly influence migration.  The estimated 
coefficient on the exchange rate is of the expected sign (peso devaluations increase the 




  Villages in Mexico are the primary source of labor to U.S. farms.  The findings 
reported in this paper suggest that the U.S. farm labor supply from Mexico is a dynamic 
process, in which past migration is the principal driver of future migration.  Our findings 
support the conclusion of several past studies that networks of existing contacts at migrant 
destinations are a key determinant of the magnitude of migration and sector of employment 
for future migrants (Munchi, 2003; Taylor, 1987).  Controlling for migration dynamics, the 
trend in Mexican migration to U.S. farm jobs is flat or possibly even negative.   
  Several policies have been implemented in recent decades in an effort to influence 
migration.  However, we find no evidence that these policies have achieved their goal of 
curtailing Mexico-to-U.S. migration flows.  The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) appears to have significantly increased the supply of Mexican workers to U.S. 
farms.  Although IRCA imposed sanctions on employers who knowingly hired unauthorized 
immigrants, few penalties have been imposed.  The legalization of large numbers of farm 
workers under the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program and the emergence of farm 
labor contractors as a risk buffer for farmers (Taylor and Thilmany, 1993) may have created 
a stimulus to migration that is reflected in our econometric results.    
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  Implementation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) also appears to 
be positively related to the number of Mexican villagers working on U.S. farms.  The 
association between trade integration and migration is complex. The U.S. Commission for 
the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development concluded 
that "expanded trade between the sending countries and the United States is the single most 
important remedy" for unwanted migration.  However, it also warned that "the economic 
development process itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate migration."  The 
same policies that accelerate economic growth, including privatization, land reform, and 
freer trade, temporarily increase migration pressures, because of the displacement and 
disruptions that accompany market liberalization (Martin, 1993). 
  Increased U.S. expenditures on border enforcement appear to have had no 
discernable effect on the U.S. farm labor supply from Mexico.  The U.S. annual border 
enforcement budget increased sevenfold between 1980 and 1995, tripled between 1995 and 
2001 and now exceeds $2.5 billion.  Border enforcement might be analogous to a sea wall 
that may resist the tide but also prevents waves that pass over it from returning to their 
source.  Stricter border enforcement has increased the probability of apprehension on any 
crossing attempt and raised the cost of U.S. entry for unauthorized migrants, but most 
migrants eventually succeed in crossing the border and now appear to stay longer in the 
United States (Public Policy Institute of California, 2002). 
In the long run, the migration of population out of rural areas surely will continue 
in Mexico, as it did previously in the United States and in all other high-income 
countries.  The econometric findings reported in this paper highlight the difficulty of 
designing and implementing policies to break this migration dynamic.  Despite U.S.  
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immigration reforms, border enforcement, and hopes for new employment opportunities 
post-NAFTA, for increasing numbers of rural Mexicans the question is not whether to 
migrate but where to go.  The answer to this question will shape the future supply of 
labor to U.S. farms.  
 12
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Means 
Variable Description  Mean 
Year Year  1991 
USFARMLAG 
# villagers in US farm jobs 
lagged one year 
2.1 
USNFRMLAG 
# villagers in US non farm 
jobs lagged one year 
4.8 
ER 
% change in Peso-Dollar 




INS border enforcement 




Dummy variable = 1 
beginning in 1994 
0.39 
IRCA 
Dummy variable = 1 
beginning in 1986 
0.70 
MGDPL 
Mexico per capita GDP in 
thousands of 1990 Pesos 
14.0 
USGDPL 
US per capita GDP in 





Table 2. Regression Coefficients 





Error  t-statistic 
(Constant)  181.253 113.593 1.596 
Year  -.093 .058 -1.594 
USFARMLAG  .898 .029 30.880 
USNFRMLAG  .029 .017 1.715 
ER  .032 .026 1.233 
INS  .000 .000 -.526 
NAFTA  .486 .228 2.136 
IRCA  .513 .289 1.778 
MGDPL  126.197 117.484 1.074 
USGDPL  90.265 100.522 .898 
  R
2 = 0.93 
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